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This article is for the voting citizens, the policymakers, the 
innovators, and the believers who all understand that climate 
change is an immense problem with numerous contributing 
factors, requiring the search for a solution, one step at a time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
California and Hawaii mandated that 100% of statewide energy 
production come from a renewable resource by 2045.1 Twelve other states 
have no mandated renewable energy targets at all, thereby allowing for a 
continuance of the reliance upon traditional fossil fuels for consumer 
demands.2 These opposed outlooks of future renewable energy standards 
represent the fringes of statewide energy policies. The other thirty-six 
states lie somewhere in the middle. 
 This dystopia of state-level energy policies results from numerous 
influencing factors, which ultimately entrench national dependence on 
fossil fuels and inhibit private economic action in the fight against climate 
change. Varying degrees of regulation of utility companies is one factor, 
while the presence of state-owned or investor-owned utility companies is 
another. Also, deeply held connections between the fossil fuel industry and 
state-level bureaucracy act to inhibit the adoption of progressive 
renewable portfolio standards. Finally, legal grants of monopolistic power 
to energy companies coupled with a lack of federal oversight and direction 
further entrench the established norm.  
 As it stands, the progress towards fighting climate change at the 
national level is in disarray,3 and there is a complete disunity of direction 
and goals at the state level. This paper highlights the disunity by providing 
a case study of the different regulations, which affect the solar power 
 
*  J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2019 
1 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards and Goals, NCSL.ORG, (Feb. 1, 2019) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx. 
2 See id. (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wyoming).  
3 Paris Agreement Under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Nov. 4, 2016 U.N.T.S (The Paris Agreement signed by 
Executive Agreement by President Obama) (Executive withdrawal by President 
Trump, effective Nov. 4, 2020). 
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industry across all fifty states, with a particular focus paid to net metering 
regulations. Through an examination of this industry, three startling 
conclusions will emerge. First, investor-owned utilities apply intense 
political pressure through lobbying efforts to maintain the current status 
quo of the utility industry’s economic model, which results in the 
disfranchisement of average citizens from profitable “green” investments. 
Second, because of lobbying pressure, states have adopted a myriad of 
approaches towards net metering regulations, thereby creating uncertainty 
affecting future solar investments. Third, in many instances, existing laws 
bar investors’ recourse to the courts; it will take innovative judicial 
challenges at the federal level to tackle future regulation. And fourth, the 
battle between solar and utility industries over the future of energy 
generation is just beginning, as solar storage laws are poised to be the next 
major front of green regulation. 
 Section II of this regulatory exposé juxtaposes the traditional 
utility economic model with the solar industry’s rise. Attention will be 
directed to the special regulatory policies and initiatives that help guide 
the rise in these competing industries. It will explore the initial success the 
solar industry had regarding net metering laws, focusing particularly on 
the early-adopting states, while also examining the laws that allowed the 
utility companies to become the monopolistic behemoths they are today. 
Section III examines the emerging clash between the solar and utility 
industries. It will expose the coordinated response that emerged from the 
utility lobby to overturn net metering legislation across the United States. 
Section IV reviews how the lobbying efforts affected a change of 
regulatory net metering policies on a state by state basis. Section V looks 
at how shifting regulatory policies have affected solar investors, 
particularly noting the uncertainty that follows net metering regulations, 
which affect past, current, and future solar investments. Also, Section V 
highlights the lack of judicial recourse for solar investors regarding the 
regulatory policies that constantly alter the rates of returns that investors 
can make off their solar installations. Section VI finishes with suggestions 
for the utility industry going forward. First, it recommends a legal 
challenge to the most drastic pro-utility net metering laws adopted in a few 
states. Second, it identifies the key new solar storage regulations that will 
be complementary to existing net metering regulations and recommends 
their adoption in other states. Also, it previews how solar storage 
regulations will be the new battleground for renewable energy adoption at 
the state level. 
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I. SECTION I  
(A) Utility Industry and Economic Model 
Centralized energy distribution models—the standard for energy 
distribution of the twenty-first century—remained largely unchanged 
since Thomas Edison pioneered his utility company, General Electric, and 
his central power plant design in 1882.4 Innovational and technological 
advances—particularly under guidance from Samuel Insull at Chicago 
Edison in the 1900s-1930s—helped cement the structure of the centralized 
distribution model of energy for consumers.5 Simplistic in form and 
structure, the model follows familiar economic terms such as “the spoke 
and wheel.” First centralized power plants tapped natural resources at a 
generation plant, which are then converted into electrical power.6 Utility 
companies, who own, operate, and control the “grid” and control 
transmission and distribution, then purchased this supply of energy.7 
Power is distributed along the grid—flowing through numerous 
transformers along power lines— and ultimately into the buildings of the 
retail consumers.8  
 The entrenchment of the centralized distribution model and the 
end pricing charged against consumers was as much an effect of 
circumstance—the need for rapid proliferation of energy for American 
consumption in the early 1900s—as it was of monopolistic policies.9 To 
the former, between 1902 and 1930, the industry grew exponentially as 
electricity prices fell year after year;10 consolidation of mass production 
by producers supplied the growing mass consumption demand;11 rural 
 
4 Edison’s Electric Light and Power System, ENGINEERING & TECH. 
HIST. WIKI, https://ethw.org/Edison's_Electric_Light_and_Power_System (last 
updated Jan. 24, 2018). 
5 Samuel Insull American Utilities Magnate, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Samuel-Insull (last updated 
July 15, 2019). 
6 Understanding the Grid, THE DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://www.energy.gov/articles/infographic-understanding-grid.  
7 Id. 
8 The Department of Energy, supra note 6, at 3. 
9 Werner Troesken, Regime Change and Corruption. A History of 
Public Utility Regulation, CORRUPTION & REFORM: LESSONS FROM AM.’S ECON. 
HIST.  at 267 (Mar. 2006) https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9986.pdf. 
10 Id. at 261. 
11 Id. 
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electrification proliferated; and affordable energy became accessible to all. 
However, for this to happen, substantial economic investments needed to 
be made, which formed the basis of a natural economic monopoly.12 
However, the natural economic monopoly was quickly subsidized in the 
form of protected legal monopolies at the state and federal level.13  
State public utility commissions (PUCs) were created at the turn of the 
twentieth century and rapidly proliferated across the United States until 
the 1940s.14 These commissions gave an exclusive franchise power to 
utility companies—to serve a given geographical area for a fee—15 
codifying the utility companies as not only natural economic monopolies, 
but also as a legal monopoly.16  
 Federal support was also lent to these natural monopolies once 
energy generation reached a point where it was being transmitted across 
interstate lines. In 1935, the federal government asserted its control over 
such sales in the Federal Power Act.17 This Act sought to provide checks 
upon the growing state monopolies’ pricing system18 by stipulating that 
the prices charged by utility companies be “just and reasonable.”19 
However, jurisprudence of what is just and reasonable has been quite 
deferential to the rate set by PUCs,20 and therefore inadvertently 
entrenched the monopolistic growth of utility companies and ensured the 
vertical integration system.21 Despite this effect, little else was done at the 
 
12 Jim Chappelow, Natural Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA FIN. DICTIONARY 
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp. 
A natural monopoly, like the name implies, is a monopoly that does not arise 
due to collusion, consolidation or hostile takeovers. Instead, natural monopolies 
occur when a company takes advantage of an industry’s high barriers to entry to 
create a “moat” or protective wall around its operations. Id.  
13 Troesken, supra note9, at 263–64. 
14 Id. at 262.  
15 Id. at 263–64. 
16 Id. at 267–68. 
17 Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)–828(c) (1935). 
18 “It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric 
energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, 
and that Federal regulation of matters relating to generation . . . is necessary in 
the public interest . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824. 
19 16 U.S.C. § 824 d (a).  
20 See discussion infra Section IV(B). 
21 Barry C. Lynn, America’s Monopolies are Holding Back the 
Economy, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/antimonopoly-big-
business/514358/. 
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federal level beyond “restructuring” the utility sector.22 The Energy Act of 
1992 saw states’ “unbundle” electricity supply from transmission and 
distribution, allowing nonutility generators to produce and sell power in 
wholesale energy markets.23 While the introduction of wholesale and retail 
competition, and the development of wholesale market institutions 
effectively helped market forces replace regulation, it did little to 
effectively break the monopoly or the vertical integration of the utility 
industry.24 
 As it stands today, two types of utility companies dominate the 
market—Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Municipal Utilities 
(MUs)—which contribute $284 billion to the U.S. economy annually.25 
Roughly seventy percent of U.S. homes are powered by electricity 
originating from investor-owned utilities.26 With corporate interests in 
mind, IOUs are allowed, at a rate determined by the public utility company 
that governs corporations, to earn a set profit on their investment. This 
profit model is directly linked to its costs. In its most simplistic form, this 
means the more an IOU spends, the higher its profit can be. However, this 
system is far from simple, and rather it is filled with financial models 
designed to profit the IOU and its shareholders, often at the expense of the 
customers they serve. Since IOUs grow their profit base by deploying 
capital, they have a natural bias towards making capital investments over 
taking actions that minimize the total costs for its customers, a.k.a the 
Averch Johnson effect.27 This directly derives from the Return on Equity 
(ROE) model and largely contributes to market inefficiencies. For 
example, fixed costs, such as investments into the grid, transmission lines, 
and power generating plants are often taken to meet a “demand” that is not 
 
22 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY MARKETS: 
CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT 
IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT (June 14, 2002). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 United States GDP From Utilities, TRADING ECON., 
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-from-utilities (last visited Sept. 
11, 2019). 
26 Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward in High Heels”: Examining and 
Addressing the Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 261 (2013). 
27 James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Are Fixed Charges a Curse in 
Disguise for Investor Owned Utilities, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 25, 2015) 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tong-and-wellinghoff-are-fixed-charges-a-
curse-in-disguise-for-investor-ow/378648/. 
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necessarily there or to “upgrade” existing infrastructure unnecessarily.28 
The more IOUs do this, the higher their potential rate of return they can 
make.29 And the only check that keeps this system from spiraling out of 
control is that this is still technically an investment risk, and IOUs have an 
obligation to operate efficiently in order to earn that ROE.30 The kicker 
though, is that in order to recoup this investment, higher fixed charges are 
tacked on to customers’ utility bills monthly.31 With few competitors to 
choose from in the market, customers can do little but pay these charges. 
To the IOU, this model is fantastic because these fixed charges represent 
a cost inefficiency somewhere in the point between generation, 
transmission and distribution which again require more investment 
(capital expenditures) to fix.32  
 Other costs are also calculated into the profitability model of 
IOUs, namely salaries and energy purchases from generators. Because 
utilities have a capped rate of return based directly off their capital 
expenditures, IOUs can funnel excess cash into executive compensation 
packages, an act which thereby increases the amount of profitability that 
can be returned the following year. The same goes for purchasing energy. 
It is in an IOUs interest to purchase large quantities of energy from 
distributors via long-term power purchase contracts which increases the 
overall capital expenditure of the company. The more money spent, the 
higher the ROE that can be claimed for its shareholders. And so the cycle 
continues. 
 With the vast sums of money at stake, it is understandable that 
utilities sought to influence state-level policies towards favoring the 
maintenance of their continued market dominance and profitability rates.33 
 
28 Id. 
29 See generally Scott, supra note 26, at 262–64 (Discussing how the 
rate setting model which determines what utility companies can charge, is 
directly dependent upon a utility’s Revenue Requirement, which is in turn based 
on multiple factors discussed in the previous sentences).  
30 See Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 27.  
31 Id. 
32 See David Roberts, After Rising For 100 Years, Electricity Demand 
is Flat and Utilities are Freaking Out, VOX (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com./energy-and-environment/2018/2/27/17052488/electricity-
demand-utilities (noting that despite electricity sales becoming stagnant over the 
last 11 years, Utility GDP growth has constantly increased). 
33 See Ari Peskoe, Unjust Unreasonable and Unduly Discriminatory: 
Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS & ENERGY L. 211, 214–15 (Prices for utility distribution service are set 
through regulatory proceedings before state public utility commissions (PUCs)” 
and “[w]hile PUCs are now more involved in the details of rate design [omit] 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:I 
 
136 
Almost uniformly, IOUs make up some of the largest campaign financiers, 
political donors, and political lobbying groups across the fifty states. For 
example, Florida Power & Light, one of the four largest IOUs in the state, 
provides power to $4.8 million Floridians in 2015, which generated a 
whopping $1.65 billion in profit that year.34 In the decade preceding that 
year, in order to protect that profit, FPL and other IOUs contributed at least 
$18 million to state politicians and political committees and $12 million 
on lobbying.35 As well, in 2017, Florida IOUs conducted a $20 million 
campaign to pass a ballot initiative seeking to ban third-party energy 
suppliers from the state altogether.36  
 IOUs are not alone in seeking to maintain their continued 
influence over the market. The fossil fuel industry is a big supporter, as 
well. With the vertically integrated system of IOUs purchasing power from 
centralized power plants, which derive the majority of their energy from 
fossil fuels, the two industries are intimately connected. For example, the 
Koch Brothers, investor magnates with enormous financial stakes in both 
the utility and fossil fuel industry, have spent enormous sums seeking to 
influence issues related to both industries. Koch Industries alone, separate 
from the network of nonprofit organizations that also fund campaigns, 
spent more than Exxon Mobile did in 2014 supporting fossil fuels.37 
Simultaneously in the same year, the Koch funded group “Americans for 
Prosperity” was an active participant in Georgia, Florida, and Kansas, in 
support of existing utility structures over emerging renewable energy 
structures.38  
 
ratemaking continues to be a top-down process that begins with an IOU’s 
proposed rates.”) 
34 Tim Dickinson, The Koch Brothers’ Dirty War on Solar Power, 
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
news/the-koch-brothers-dirty-war-on-solar-power-193325/. 
35 Id. 
36 Julia Pyper, How Solar Scored a ‘Game-Chaning’ Victory in 
Florida, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-solar-scored-a-game-
changing-victory-in-florida#gs.Y3g0WmDX. 
37 Gideon Wiessman & Bret Fanshaw, Blocking the Sun 12: Utilities 
and Fossil Fuel Interests That Are Undermining American Solar Power, 
FRONTIER GROUP, at 13 (Oct. 2015), 
https://environmentamericacenter.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_Blocki
ngtheSun_scrn_0.pdf. 
38 Id. 13–14. 
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 Municipal Utilities (MUs), representing most of the remaining 
thirty percent market share of utility providers, present a stark contrast to 
IOUs. As a government-owned utility, most are established as nonprofit 
entities that do not answer to shareholders.39 In this structure, they have 
access to tax-exempt financing for their investments, they do not pay 
federal income tax on their margins, and they generally compensate their 
executives on par with government levels.40  Essentially, MUs take the 
money IOUs pay in income taxes and profits to its shareholders and spend 
it more outright on its customer base instead. This generally results in 
providing cheaper residential electricity for its customers, while also 
delivering more reliable service and faster restoration periods after power 
failures.41   
 
(B) Solar Industry and Economic Model 
 The growth of the solar industry in the United States has been 
directly reliant upon technological innovation and decreasing costs of 
production, government back subsidization of investments in solar, and 
third-party market entrepreneurs.42 A brief history. The first solar cell was 
built in 1954 and became commercially available in 1956.43 However, at 
a cost of $300 per watt,44 and at a four percent energy conversion 
efficiency rate,45 it was far beyond reach for mass adoption. Over the next 
twenty years, the NASA space program spearheaded research and 
development in the solar field, and NASA’s first practical use was to 
 
39Diane Cardwell, Cities Weigh Taking Over From Private Utilities, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-environment/cities-
weigh-taking-electricity-business-from-private-utilities.html. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 John Rogers & Laura Wisland, Solar Power on the Rise, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, at 5 (Aug. 2014), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2014/08/Solar-Power-on-the-
Rise.pdf. 
43 Victoria C., The History of Solar Power, EXPERIENCE (June 29, 
2017), https://www.experience.com/advice/careers/ideas/the-history-of-solar-
power/. 
44 Id. 
45 Luke Richardson, The History and Invention of Solar Panel 
Technology, ENERGYSAGE (May 3, 2018), https://news.energysage.com/the-
history-and-invention-of-solar-panel-technology/. 
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power satellites in space.46 By the 1970s, the cost per watt dropped to 
twenty dollars, but such costs were still prohibitive and general solar 
adoption was limited to government buildings, remote location power 
production, and large corporations.47 This downward trend in cost 
continued through the 1990s and into the 2000s until, almost fifty years 
after its invention, solar became commercially viable for the average 
consumer.48  
 Government backing was the second major incentive for the solar 
industry’s advancement, and it has fit the conclusion that “[i]ncentives that 
reduce the up-front cost of adoption and that are subject to low uncertainty 
are found to have the largest impact [on solar adoption].”49 The first major 
push at the legislative scale came under the Carter administration.50 In 
1978, the Carter administration signed into law the Energy Tax Act to 
“provide tax incentives for the production and conservation of energy.”51 
This act created the first commercial and residential energy credit equating 
to thirty percent of the first $2,000 investment and a twenty percent credit 
on the next $8,000.52 The credit failed to have the desired effect53 and did 
 
46 Id. In 1958, the Vanguard I satellite used a one-watt panel, and by 
1964 NASA launched the first Nimbus spacecraft which was a fully self-
sufficient satellite operating entirely on a 470-watt system. Id. 
47 See Victoria C. supra, note 43. 
48 See Richardson, supra, note 45 (“[T]he average individual home unit 
installation cost has fallen year over year, dropping nearly 70% from 2010 to 
2017, pre subsidation levels.”); see generally John Farrell, Solar PV Economies 
of Scale Improve in 2010, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (Sept. 15, 2011), 
https://ilsr.org/solar-pv-economies-scale-improve-2010/ (discussing an in-depth 
report of dropping solar rates from 2009-10). 
49 Ilya Chernyakhovskiy, Solar PV Adoption in the United States: An 
Empirical Investigation of State Policy Effectiveness, U. MASS. AMHERST 
(Masters Thesis) (2015), 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&arti
cle=1097&context=masters_theses_2. 
50 Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95–618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978). 
51 Id. 
52 Energy Tax Act at 3175. 
53 See The President’s Energy Program, Phase III: Hearings Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27–30 (1979) 
(statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel) (“The principal tax credit bill we passed last 
year does not seem to have given great incentive in the marketplace . . . The tax 
credit does not motivate, but rather simply occurs at the end of the year when 
the fellow finds there was a tax credit available. And I do not think that is a very 
efficient and effective stimulus.”). 
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not coincide with the widespread adoption of solar.54 The solar industry 
continued its slow trudge towards mass adoption until 2005 when the Bush 
administration reintroduced the solar residential tax credit and increased 
the commercial tax credit.55 What was supposed to be a two-year tax credit 
extended four times56 and is widely credited with assisting the solar 
industry’s 1600% growth since 2005.57  
Many state-level incentives accompanied the twelve-year period 
of tax credits at the federal level. California, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii 
all offered individual state tax benefits, in the form of tax credits, tax 
deductions, sales tax exemptions, property tax exemptions, and net 
metering benefits.58 These federal and state-level tax credits and subsidies 
helped to reduce the average cost per installation unit (pre-incentives) 
from $17,000 to about $12,000 in 2017.59 This reduction in cost helps 
 
54 Matthew Sabas, History of Solar Power, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. 
(Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/renewable/solar/history-of-solar-
power/. 
55 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–58, 199 Stat. 594 (codified 
as amended at 42 USCA § 15801 (2005)).  
56 The tax credit was passed for a two-year period but was extended in 
2006. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–432, 120 Stat. 2922. 
This was again extended during the 2008 financial bailout package through 
2016. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–343, Div. A, 
122 Stat. 3765. In 2015, the investment tax credit was extended once again, 
although it iterated a phase-out of the tax credit by the year 2022.  I.R.C. § 
48(a)(5)(E)–(6)(B) (Supp. III 2015).  
57 The Future of the Investment Tax Credit Under President Trump, 
SULLIVAN SOLAR POWER (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.sullivansolarpower.com/about/news-and-events/industry-news/the-
future-of-the-investment-tax-credit-under-president-trump.html. 
58 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 73 (West 2019) (implementing 
California property tax exemptions for installed solar systems, allowing business 
and homeowners to exclude the added value of a system from the valuation of 
their property for taxation purposes); ARIZ. REV. STAT. tit. 43 § 1083(a)–(b) 
(LexisNexis 2019) (explaining that Arizona’s State solar tax credit grants 25% 
of the total system cost, up to $1000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 701B.005 (West 
2019) (Nevada’s state rebate program for solar installation systems); N.J. REV. 
STAT. tit. 54 § 54:32B-8.33 (2019) (New Jersey’s sales tax exemption). But see 
Oklahoma – Energy Tax Credit, Solar Rebates and Incentives, DASOLAR 
ENERGY, https://www.dasolar.com/energytaxcredit-rebates-grants/oklahoma 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (explaining that Oklahoma offers no Sales tax 
exemptions, no property tax exemptions, no solar power performance payments, 
no solar energy rebates).  
59 Id. 
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create a regulatory system to provide a return for a solar installation 
investment, which has altogether driven solar adoption nationwide.60  
 The third market driver for solar adoption in the U.S. is the rise of 
third-party investors allowing for innovative ownership structures.61 Many 
companies, including solar manufacturers, offered financing methods for 
homeowners principally in the form of leasing or power purchases 
agreements.62 These structures often require little to no money down for 
the homeowner and offer attractive fixed long term power purchase rates.63 
Essentially, solar installers own the system, and the customer leases it and 
pays off that lease by “buying” the electricity generated on-site at set rates. 
These methods directly contribute to the mass adoption of solar by the 
average consumer who otherwise is unable to afford the upfront 
investment costs.64 It is so successful that a study of solar adoption in 
leading solar states, Arizona, California, and New Jersey, found that 
installations are overwhelmingly occurring in middle-class neighborhoods 
with median household incomes ranging from $40,000 to $90,000.65  
Despite all the market forces that drove solar adoption, current 
solar production capacity is limited. Across the U.S., photovoltaic capacity 
 
60 Alex Crees, Best and Worst Ranked States for Solar Industry 
Growth, CHOOSE ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.chooseenergy.com/news/article/best-and-worst-ranked-states-for-
solar-industry-growth. While not conclusive on its own, it should be of little 
surprise that Oklahoma, without such incentives, ranks among the worst U.S. 
states for solar power with only 32 solar related companies, less than 700 
residences powered by solar, and less than .01% of the states total electricity 
coming from solar. Id. 
61 See Rogers & Wisland supra, note 42.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Mari Hernandez, Solar Power to the People: The Rise of Rooftop 
Solar Among the Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2013, 9:07 
AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2013/10/21/76013/solar-
power-to-the-people-the-rise-of-rooftop-solar-among-the-middle-class/. The 
reality of this development is staggering with Arizona Public Service databases 
reporting 80% of solar power adoption in that state was from low to middle 
income households, 67% for California, and 63% for Nevada. Id. In fact, nearly 
83% of all solar investments in New Jersey, a solar energy leader, were 
facilitated through leases or power purchase agreements. Third Party Solar 
Financing, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/third-party-solar-financing 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
65 See Hernandez supra, note 64.  
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(both residential and commercial) sits at only sixty-six gigawatts, enough 
to power 12 million homes.66  While this number is small on a macro level, 
one cannot deny the economic benefits the emerging industry represents. 
The U.S. solar industry, in 2017, generated $17 billion in investments and 
had more than 10,000 companies active in the field.67 Those companies 
combine to employ over 250,000 people in the United States and do so 
across a range of technical skills requirements.68 Work in solar includes 
installation, manufacturing, engineering, sales and marketing, finance, 
project development, and much more.69 With its continued adoption, the 
solar industry promises to employ thousands, if not millions more, across 
the US. 
II. SECTION II 
(A) The Rise of Net Metering 
Considering the well-established centralized distribution of 
energy model that governed utility companies for the last century, it should 
be of no shock that the rise of solar would pose a market threat. It seemed 
inevitable that as time elapsed the two energy industries would soon come 
to conflict with one another. By the 1980s, solar innovation transformed 
the idea of distributed generation of energy into an economic reality.70 In 
1979, solar pioneer Steven Strong built a Department of Energy-funded 
solar house that had the solar generating capacity to outproduce its 
demand.71 The home was specifically engineered to feed the excess 
production of power back to the utility company, and a small meter 
installed with the home would indicate with an arrow, pointing forward or 
backward respectively, whether the house was drawing energy from the 
grid or feeding into it. 72 This simply became coined as net metering. 
 
66 Solar Market Insight Report 2018 Year In Review, SEIA (Mar. 13, 
2019), https://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-
2018-year-review. 
67 Solar Industry Research Data, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/solar-
industry-research-data (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
68 This number is more than double the employment in 2012. Id.  
69 National Solar Jobs Census, THE SOLAR FOUND., 
https://www.thesolarfoundation.org/national/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
70 Roberto Verzola, Net energy metering opens the floodgates to solar 
rooftops and other small-scale renewables (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://rverzola.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/1823/. 
71 Id. (quoting BOB JOHNSTONE, SWITCHING TO SOLAR: WHAT WE CAN 
LEARN FROM GERMANY’S SUCCESS IN HARNESSING CLEAN ENERGY 91 (2011)). 
72 Id. 
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As a concept, net metering followed the simplicity of the original 
house built by Strong. Distributed generation, rising from solar and wind 
generators, reverses the energy meter when supplying excess energy to the 
grid.73 Conceptually, this meant that the one meter that measured 
electricity in also measured electricity out.74 In reality, this meant that 
“parity pricing” became the standard net metering model.75 That is, 
distributed generators receive payment for their generation at the same 
rate, “the retail rate,” that they would pay for their consumption.76 
Ultimately, this was the standard formula that states and utility companies 
themselves would adopt going forward.77  
However, the adoption of net metering policies was far from 
uniform across the fifty states. From Steven Strong’s net metering 
experiment in 1979-2012, only forty of the fifty states adopted net 
metering laws.78 Despite this though, by 2012, net metering laws were 
intimately linked to solar adoption, and its effects were readily apparent; 
ninety-nine% of all newly installed solar systems in the United States that 
year were net-metered.79 Moreover, with this concerted action, it was 
inevitable that an “equal and opposite reaction” would soon take place.  
 
(B) Utility Company Pushback and the “Utility Death Spiral” 
 With the adoption of solar finally reaching a critical mass whereby 
it had the potential to displace utility company profits by reducing load 
demand, there was a concerted pushback from the utility companies 
themselves. In 2012-13, The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the utility 
lobby, which represents IOUs, qualified distributed-generation and net-
metering as a “disruptive technology” that could compete with utility 
companies in the market of power distribution and thereby lead to 
declining retail sales, loss of customers, and potential obsolescence. 80 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 5. 
78 Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility 
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/rooftop-solar-panels-tax-credits-
utility-companies-lobbying.html. 
79 See Verzola, supra note 70, at 9. 
80 Id. 
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Thus, the utility industry initiated a coordinated effort to repeal, replace, 
and render ineffective existing net metering laws.81 
 This effort centralized its focus on three arguments against net 
metering across the United States. The first argument focused its attack on 
the parity pricing model as stated by the EEI: 
 
Because of the way that net metering policies originally 
were designed, net-metered customers often are credited 
for the power they sell to electric companies, usually at 
the full retail electricity rate, even though it would cost 
less for the companies to produce the electricity 
themselves or to buy the power on the wholesale market 
from other electricity providers.82 
 
 The second major argument that the utilities put forth focused on 
the effect net metering had on the grid. It argued that solar equipped 
homeowners, especially homeowners who net meter to the point where 
they get credits from the utility company, get a free ride from the use of 
the grid.83 Ultimately, this would shift grid maintenance costs to those who 
do have net metering capacities and would thereby create economic 
inequality among customers’ utility bills.84 Also, the marketability of this 
argument increased when discovery displayed that solar adoption 
primarily benefited the wealthy and that such adoption and continuance of 
net metering policies would give the wealthy the market advantage, while 
shifting grid maintenance costs to the poor who could not afford to install 
solar systems.85 
 
81 See Tabuchi, supra note 78. 
82 Spread of Net Metering, & Utility Backlash – Net Metering History 
Part 3, Clean Technica (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://cleantechnica.com/2015/09/10/spread-of-net-metering-utility-backlash-
net-metering-history-logic-part-2/. 
83 See Tabuchi, supra note 78. 
84 Id. 
85 See generally Monica Martinez, The Poor Shouldn’t Have to Bear 
the Cost of Solar Power, FORBES (June 13, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/13/the-poor-shouldnt-have-to-
bear-the-cost-of-solar-power/#5060ea9ce322; Dan Way, Duke Energy: 
Renewable Power Has Poor Subsidizing Wealthy, CAROLINA J., (Jan. 9, 2014), 
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/duke-energy-renewable-power-
has-poor-subsidizing-wealthy/ (outlining this cost shifting argument). But see 
Hernandez, supra note 64 (the majority of solar adoption is from low to middle 
income homes). 
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 While the credibility of the arguments is a constant source of 
consternation for solar proponents,86 they had a significant legislative 
effect upon net metering policies across the United States. Since 2013, 
nearly every state with a net metering policy has undertaken a review of 
their regulations; almost all states modified their approach towards it. With 
actions ranging from eliminating net metering to maintaining the status 
quo, the approach that the fifty states took regarding distributed 
generations is anything but united. Instead, the distributed generation and 
net metering policies across the fifty states represent a quagmire of diverse 
political and economic agendas in the form of constantly shifting laws and 
regulations. The next section of this market exposé will seek to wade 
 
86 See Evaluation of Net Metering in Vermont Conducted Pursuant to 
Act 125 of 2012, PUB. SERV. DEP’T, 6–28 (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2013ExternalReports/285580.pdf (evaluating 
from a ratepayer standpoint if customers using net metering systems are 
subsidized by other customers who do not employ net metering, it was 
determined that non-solar customers benefit from net metering as the increase in 
net-metering systems decreases the non-solar ratepayers costs of energy, 
capacity, and transmission which directly contribute to the overall rate paid); 
Lindsey Hallock & Rob Sargent, Shining Rewards The Value of Rooftop Solar 
Power for Consumers and Society, THE FRONTIER GRP. (2015), 
https://environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_shiningrewar
ds_print.pdf (reviewing 11 net metering studies that came, individually, to the 
conclusion that the retail rate at net metering distributed generation is 
compensated is actually undervalued in comparison to the benefits it provides, 
thereby rebutting the attacks against the parity pricing model); Me. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study (Mar. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nrcm.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/MPUCValueofSolarReport.p
df (finding that non-solar ratepayers derive a substantial benefit from distributed 
generation in that the distributed energy sold saves the non-solar ratepayer in the 
form of electricity costs by displacing costs normally calculated into energy 
costs supplied by the utility company including purchasing energy from more 
expensive power sources, reduced transmission costs on the electric grid system, 
reduced future investment costs to build more centralized power plants to meet 
peak demand, and the stabilization of energy prices at peak periods); Nevada 
Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation, ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., INC., 6–7 
(July 2014), 
http://puc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pucnvgov/Content/About/Media_Outreach/Ann
ouncements/Announcements/E3%20PUCN%20NEM%20Report%202014.pdf?
pdf=Net-Metering-Study (determining that the impact Net Metering policies and 
distributed generation benefits had from 2004-2016 upon non-solar participants 
was a $36 million dollar savings and that after net metering regulation changes 
in 2016, the cost-shifting towards non-solar participants would be negligible). 
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through these competing approaches and to bring a sense of understanding 
for those trying to make educated decisions regarding future investments. 
 
III. SECTION III 
(A) Arkansas 
 The Arkansas Renewable Energy Development Act of 2001 made 
Arkansas one of the early adopters of net metering regulation.87 However, 
by 2017, adoption by net metering customers had not taken off with only 
500 net metering customer’s in the state.88 This undoubtedly is a 
correlation to the law banning third-party investors from participating in 
net metering adoption,89 which as stated in Section II(B) supra, was one 
of the primary drivers of solar adoption. However, this relatively low 
adoption did not deter the utility lobby from presenting its arguments to 
the Arkansas Legislature.90 The effect that these arguments had was 
readily apparent as the Arkansas Public Utilities Commission’s working 
groups on net metering became divided along ideological lines, with one 
working group advocating a change to the retail parity pricing module and 
another recommending a continuation of the parity pricing status quo.91 
New legislation soon followed that sent a mixed signal.92 In the first 
instance, legislation in 2017 grandfathered existing retail rates for existing 
net metering customers statewide.93 However, for new solar installation 
investors, a new pricing module was established. The new module had four 
major components. First, the Arkansas Public Utility Commission 
 
87 Kyle Massey, Private solar’s future In Arkansas hinges on review, 
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/23/private-solars-future-in-
arkansas-hinges-on-review/. 
88 Id. 
89 Fran Alexander, Opinion, Let Arkansas Shine, ARK. DEMOCRAT 
GAZETTE (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/feb/19/fran-alexander-let-arkansas-
shine-20190/?opinion. 
90 Id. 
91 Robert Walton, Arkansas net metering working group fails to reach 
consensus, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/arkansas-net-metering-working-group-fails-
to-reach-consensus/505203/. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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(APUC) adopted aggregate94 net metering.95 Second, the APUC replaced 
retail parity pricing with an “avoided cost” pricing system.96 Third, 
Arkansas implemented indefinite carry-over periods for positive net 
metering.97 And fourth, Arkansas implemented a residential net metering 
cap of 25kW or 100% of the net metering customer’s highest monthly 
usage in the previous twelve months of residential use, whichever is 
greater.98 Currently, as we stand today, the Arkansas Senate has proposed 
Bill 145, which seeks to eliminate the ban of third-party solar investments 
in the state.99 
 
(B) California  
 California has unquestionably been the leading state for 
distributed generation and net metering adoption.100 California’s first net 
metering policy followed the Parity Pricing Retail rate model but 
implemented a distributed generation cap of five percent of total peak 
electricity demand for its investor owned utilities (IOUs).101 However, 
utility lobbying in California also had an effect and in 2016, the California 
Public Utilities Commission approved Decision (D.) 16-01-044, which 
aimed to continue the net metering structure while also making 
adjustments to align the costs of new net metering customers with those of 
non-metering customers.102 However, with the widespread adoption of 
solar, California’s IOUs quickly reached their five percent cap by 2015, 
and California adopted its next-generation program known as Net 
 
94 “‘Aggregate net metering’ is a modification to net metering that . . . 
allow[s] electric customers to offset energy use at all meters or buildings with 
solar at any meter or building.” John Farrell, Aggregate Net Metering, INST. FOR 
LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (June 5, 2015), https://ilsr.org/aggregate-net-metering/. 
95 Net-Metering Rules, Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2-1/2 (Sept. 15, 
2017), http://www.apscservices.info/Rules/net_metering_rules.pdf. 
96 Id. at 2-2. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at B-1. 
99 See Alexander, supra note 89. 
100 Sara Matasci, Explaining Net Metering 2.0 in California, 
ENERGYSAGE (Jan. 2, 2019), https://news.energysage.com/net-metering-2-0-in-
california-everything-you-need-to-know/. 
101 Id. 
102 Net Energy Rule Making (R.) 14-07-002, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3934 (accessed on Mar. 09, 2018). 
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Metering 2.0.103 Four features classify this new structure.104 First, previous 
net metering systems are grandfathered in at the retail rate for 20 years.105 
Second, new solar installations parity pricing module was replaced with a 
“Time of Use”106 compensation rate.107 Third, utility companies are 
allowed to charge a one-time interconnection fee to connect new solar 
panels to the electric grid.108 And fourth, distributed generation systems 
would have to pay non-bypassable charges to the utility company for 
energy bought from the company, which they did not have to 
previously.109 
 
(C) Colorado 
Colorado was another early net metering adopter; although 
uniquely, net metering resulted from a mandate through a public ballot 
initiative approved by Colorado voters in 2004.110 Since then it has been a 
pioneer in offering various new forms of eligibility for net metering 
systems including aggregate net metering, community solar gardens, and 
now Solar-Plus-Storage systems.111 As of December 2018, the Colorado 
net metering regulatory landscape looks as follows: first, there is a 
distributed generation system cap of 120% of a customer’s average annual 
consumption, allowing for varying system caps based upon a customer’s 
needs.112 Second, distributed generation customers who become net 
 
103 See Matasci, supra note 100.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 “In a [Time of Use] rate structure, the cost of electricity varies 
throughout the day based on electricity demand. The highest electricity prices 
come in the afternoon and evening, when air conditioners are running at top 
speed and customers are returning home from work. Solar system owners on 
TOU rates still receive a credit worth the cost of one kWh for every kWh they 
generate. However, because the rate changes throughout the day, the value of 
net metering credits is also variable. One kWh of solar electricity sent back to 
the grid at 10 am, during ‘off peak’ hours, will be worth less than a kWh sent 
back to the grid in the afternoon and evening ‘peak’ hours.” Sara Matasci, Solar 
and time-of-use electricity rates: what you need to know, ENERGYSAGE (July 27, 
2017), https://news.energysage.com/solar-time-use-electricity-rates-need-know/. 
107 See Matasci, supra note 101.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Colorado Net Metering, DSIRE, 
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/271 (last updated Nov. 30, 
2018). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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exporters are compensated with monthly carry-over credits at a 1:1 ratio 
of kW hours produced.113 After a year, customers can choose to carry over 
their production indefinitely or receive cash compensation at the utilities 
average hourly incremental cost of the preceding calendar year.114 
Moreover, distributed generation producers are eligible to receive 
renewable energy credits, which can be sold to public utility companies.115 
All in all, Colorado is a pioneer in energy storage, and Governor 
Hickenlooper declared solar storage as an energy right for Colorado’s 
constituents.116 
 
(D) Connecticut 
 In Connecticut, the utility lobby successfully implemented its 
anti-net metering agenda.117 The state legislature passed one of the most 
retrogressive net metering policies in the country in 2018.118 First, existing 
net metering customers are grandfathered in for the next twenty years, and 
new net metering opportunities are not open to new customers.119 Second, 
new distributed generation systems are compensated either in a “buy 
all/sell all” format120 or in an excess production over a specified period 
format.121 The former mandates that utility companies purchase all energy 
generated by customers at a wholesale rate, regardless of the amount 
generated, and then sell all of the energy needed by those same customers 
back to them at a retail rate, effectively prohibiting customers from 
utilizing their own generated energy.122 The alternative format allows for 
distributed generators to consume their own power and sell their excess 
power back to utility companies, but only if that excess is produced during 
a specified period set by public utility companies.123  
 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-130 (2018). 
117 Stephen Pelton, Eliminating net metering was a huge step 
backward, CT Mirror (Jan. 17, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/category/ct-
viewpoints/eliminating-net-metering-is-a-huge-step-backward/. 
118 S. B. 9, Conn. Gen. Assemb. (2018). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See Pelton, supra note 117. 
123 Id. 
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(E) Hawaii 
 Hawaii was initially a pioneer in net metering adoption. In 2001, 
the state implemented its retail rate net metering regulation.124 This retail 
rate, in addition to Hawaii’s high energy costs because fossil fuels for 
energy needed to ship to Hawaii’s local power generators, which made 
Hawaii one of the most expensive states for electricity, created a push for 
widespread distributed generation adoption. Ultimately, it reached sixteen 
percent penetration on some islands.125 However, Hawaii’s regulation is 
an interesting cautionary tale of what can happen when rapid net metering 
adoption takes place.126 In 2015, Hawaii succumbed to lobbying from 
IOUs and shut down the net metering program completely. Two interim 
systems replaced the net metering program. First, in high solar penetration 
areas, solar customers were able to continue sending energy back to the 
grid, without receiving any compensation for their exports.127 In non-high 
solar penetration areas, distributed generators were compensated for their 
exports at a wholesale rate, while simultaneously paying a $25 monthly 
grid connection cost to the IOU. These interim systems were replaced in 
2018 by two new tariffs, which accompanied the adoption of solar-storage 
systems. Hawaii now has a Customer Grid Supply Plus tariff, which is a 
first-come-first-serve rate for residential and small commercial systems 
with a region-specific capacity limit.128 This system credits customers at a 
variable rate by island and with ultimate control of the output from 
distributed generation systems controlled by utility companies. The other 
system, the Smart Export tariff, posits excess generation to an on-site 
battery system during daylight hours with the discharge of that stored 
electricity to happen during the evening.129 Excess electricity exported to 
the grid in the evening, overnight, and early morning receives a credit, 
 
124 Eric Wesoff, Rooftop Solar in Oahu Crashes with Loss of Net 
Metering, Lack of Self-Supply Installs, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/rooftop-solar-in-hawaii-crashes-
with-loss-of-net-metering-lack-self-supply#gs.IakcyOOA. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. (“Hawaii has an unprecedented amount of DG PV feeding into 
[their] isolated island grids . . . There are limits to what today’s grids can 
accommodate . . . Even if surplus power does not feed back into the grid, . . . 
there are limits as to just how low combustion generators can be ramped 
down.”). 
127 Id. 
128 Hawaii Distributed Generation Tariffs, DSIRE, 
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/596 (last updated Nov. 28, 
2018). 
129 Id. 
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again at a variable rate by island.130 Furthermore, regardless of the tariff, 
there is a 100 kW system capacity limit on three of Hawaii’s islands and a 
50 kW limit on the Fourth of July.131  
(F) Indiana 
 Indiana is another state which has acquiesced to arguments put 
forth by the utility lobby,132 despite the fact that Indiana Power & Light, 
one of Indiana’s IOUs, had only 100 solar generation customers.133 Indiana 
passed legislation to ultimately phase out net metering from the state.134 
Currently, Indiana’s net metering regulatory climate consists of three 
regressive policies. First, a grandfather clause for existing net metering 
customers.135 Second, the retail rate credit is replaced with a wholesale-
plus-premium credit, effectively replacing the eleven cents per kW charge 
with a four cents per kWh charge.136 Third, a statewide 1.5% peak summer 
load distributed generation cap is also implemented.137 
 
(G)  Florida 
 Florida has a mixed history with net metering. It was a late state 
adopter, only establishing its own net metering regulations in 2008. The 
regulation initially implemented a parity pricing compensation system, but 
it simultaneously charged customers both “customer charges” and 
“demand charges” regardless of whether excess energy is delivered to the 
utility company.138 Other familiar models were present in the 2008 
regulations. First, there is a 10 kW residential system cap as well as an 
IOU system generating cap limited to 115% of the household’s monthly 
 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See Tabuchi, supra note 78, (“[A] group of utility lobbyists 
descended on the statehouse, handing out talking points that said credits for 
rooftop solar panels lead to higher rates for everyone else. They were there to 
support a bill . . . that would roll back Indiana’s net metering system by reducing 
the rate utilities paid to solar consumers for their excess electricity.”). 
133 Robert Walton, Indiana Will Phase Out Retail Rate Net Metering, 
UTILITY DIVE (May 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/indiana-will-
phase-out-retail-rate-net-metering/441932/. 
134 Id. 
135 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-14 
136 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-18; Walton supra, note 133. 
137 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-10. 
138 Docket No. 070674-EI; PSC-08-0161-FOF-EI (3) (2008).  
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kW usage.139 Second, excess credits at the end of each annual billing cycle 
are payment claimable by the distributed generator customer at the 
Avoided Cost rate.140 Third, application fees are required, ranging from 
$400 to $1000, for distributed generator systems with a capacity over 
between 10kW and 2000kW.141 And fourth, there is no state-wide net 
metering cap.142 However, Florida has long locked out third-party solar 
investments, thereby crippling adoption.143 This position was recently 
reversed in 2018, albeit the new legal requirements for third-party 
participation is far from clear.144 
 
(H) Maine  
 Maine’s net metering regulatory landscape can be described as 
tumultuous at best. IOU lobbying had a great effect, and in 2017, Maine 
discarded its net metering laws and adopted the first buy all/sell all pricing 
system in the United States.145 To implement this system, Maine adopted 
a “gross metering” on-site system requirement that required expensive 
initial investments born by distributed generators so that the Maine 
government measured net metering production.146 However, this system 
proved disastrous, cost ratepayers as much as $3,300 per installation.147 
over the next year, and has been slowly dismantled.148 The gross metering 
requirement was repealed for medium and large size distributed 
 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at (8)e-f. 
141 Id. at 4(f). 
142 See generally Docket No. 070674-EI; PSC-08-0161-FOF-EI (no 
statewide cap).  
143 See Pyper supra, note 36.   
144 Id. (Florida’s reversal on third-party participation still bans the sale 
of electricity from third-party providers, thereby forcing companies like Sunrun 
to alter their power purchase agreements to become a true equipment leasing 
agreement rather than a contract for energy agreement.) 
145 Distributed Generation Buy-All Sell-All Program, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://www.energy.gov/savings/distributed-generation-buy-all-sell-all-program 
(accessed Mar. 6, 2019). 
146 Christian Roselund, Maine Regulators Reverse Gross Metering 
Decision for Mid-sized Large Customers, PV-Magainze (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2018/12/12/maine-regulators-reverse-gross-
metering-decision-for-mid-sized-large-customers/. 
147 Id. 
148 Maine PUC Stops Tax on Medium & Large Customers Using Their 
Own Power, NAT. RESOURCES COUNCIL OF MAINE (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nrcm.org/maine-environmental-news/maine-puc-stops-tax-
medium-large-customers-using-own-solar-power/. 
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generators,149 and the Maine legislature is currently considering a bill to 
eliminate the gross metering requirement for all system sizes going 
forward.150  
 
(I) Mississippi 
 Mississippi’s net Metering regulatory landscape has been directly 
affected by utility lobbying efforts. A late-comer to the solar game, 
Mississippi’s regulatory actions regarding net metering epitomize the 
conflict between solar advocates and utility companies, despite the fact 
that Mississippi had little to no net metering projects at that time.151 In 
2014, the Mississippi commission released a study that agreed with the 
solar advocates’ position that net metering posed a benefit for Mississippi 
customers.152 However, the state’s utility regulators deviated from the 
report’s recommendation and instead sought to implement a compromise 
between solar advocates’ compensation request of ten cents per kilowatt-
hour generated and utility companies’ request of 4 to 4.5 cents per 
kilowatt-hour generated (the wholesale rate).153 Finding a middle ground, 
Mississippi credited customers at the wholesale electricity rate (the 
avoided cost rate) plus 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, averaging to about 7 to 
7.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.154 Second, Mississippi sought to incentivize 
low-income adoption by creating an additional two cents per kilowatt-hour 
for the first 1000 customers (per the two IOUs) that installed distributed 
 
149 See Roselund, supra, note 146.  
150 Betsy Lillian, Maine Legislature Holding Public Hearing on Bill to 
Repeal Gross Metering, SOLAR INDUSTRY (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://solarindustrymag.com/maine-legislature-holding-public-hearing-on-bill-
to-repeal-gross-metering/. 
151 Julia Pyper, Mississippi Regulators Strive for Compromise with New 
Net Metering Rule, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 07, 2015), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/mississippi-regulators-strive-for-
compromise-with-new-net-metering-rule#gs.1196lf. 
152 See generally Stanton ET AL., Net Metering in Mississippi Costs, 
Benefits, and Policy Considerations 2, 3 (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.synapse-
energy.com/sites/default/files/Net%20Metering%20in%20Mississippi.pdf.   
153 See Pyper, supra note 151.  
154 CMSR 39-000-004(II)03-106; Mississippi Public Service 
Commission Schedule No. 59 (Sept. 18, 2016),  
https://www.mississippipower.com/content/dam/mississippi-
power/pdfs/business/pricing-and-rates/special-application-rates/RENM.pdf. 
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generation projects.155 Third, the state has a three percent statewide net 
metering cap and a 20kW residential system cap.156 What is perhaps most 
interesting about Mississippi’s regulatory field is not the unsurprising fact 
that it has led to slow adoption of distributed generation customers, but 
rather that the Public Service Commission is now overdue on its mandated 
compensation review, which was to happen on or before January 2019.157 
Considering that adoption was slow, one can only query why the rate 
compensation scheme did not reach an equilibrium in its compromise but 
rather reached a decision that maintained the status quo for the utility 
industry. 
 
(J) Nevada 
 Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid once described Nevada as the 
“Saudi Arabia of solar energy.”158 For a long time, Nevada held up that 
high praise as a pioneer in the solar industry. However, in 2014, the 
Nevada Public Utilities Commission, bowing to pressure from utility 
companies, adopted a retrogressive net metering pricing model. The model 
replaced the retail parity pricing structure with a declining model that 
bottomed out at the wholesale rate of electricity159 and added an additional 
three-part rate for distributed generation services including a monthly 
service charge, a demand charge, and an energy charge.160 This new model 
had no grandfather clause and applied retroactively to all 17,000 existing 
solar customers.161 Under the 2015 regime, solar providers left the state 
almost instantly, and the solar industry laid off hundreds of individuals 
from their jobs.162 However, economics and voter backlash resulted in the 
 
155 Id. 
156 CMSR 39-000-004(II)03-101-02. 
157 Id. See Mississippi Public Service Commission Schedule No. 59, 
supra note 133. Without this review, the 2.5 cent compensation buffer became 
optional for utility companies to pay as of January 3, 2019.  
158 See Dickinson supra, note 34.  
159 Julia Pyper, Nevada Regulators Eliminate Retail Rate Net Metering 
for New and Existing Solar Customers, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 23, 2015), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Nevada-Regulators-Eliminate-
Retail-Rate-Net-Metering-for-New-and-Existing-S#gs.XRpklExz. 
160 Application of Nevada Power Company: Before the Public Utilities 
Commission of Nevada, No. 15-07042 at 55 (Dec. 21, 2015, 8:27 AM), 
http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS_2015_THRU_PRESEN
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161 See Dickinson, supra note 34. 
162 Jan Ellen Spiegel, In Northeast net metering in flux as states look to 
reform solar policy, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (July 17, 2018), 
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restoration of Nevada’s pro-net metering outlook. In 2017, the Public 
Utilities Commission of Nevada set forth new net metering guidelines. 
Under the new regime, compensation for excess generation is credited at 
ninety-five percent of the retail electricity rate.163 Furthermore, 
compensation is paid for the net excess of electricity sent back to the utility 
on a monthly basis rather than on a kW per hour basis.164 Under the new 
net-metering laws, Nevada reestablished itself as a force in the net 
metering industry. While there were only 287 net metering applications in 
2016, under the 2015 regime, there were 3,200 applications the following 
year after the new net metering legislation was implemented.165 
 
(K)  New Jersey 
 New Jersey has long been at the forefront of the renewable energy 
adoption, and despite utility-funded campaign efforts, New Jersey stands 
out among the pack with one of the most progressive renewable portfolio 
standards in the nation.166 In seeking to meet New Jersey’s advanced 2050 
goals, it is unsurprising that net metering became a major focus of the 
current energy portfolio in the state. In New Jersey, four major features 
define the net metering agenda. First, distributed generation customers are 
credited at the full retail rate for their monthly excess generation.167 
Second, distributed generation customers do not have a system capacity 
size limit on their installations, although the system generation cannot 
 
https://energynews.us/2018/07/17/northeast/in-northeast-net-metering-in-flux-
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164 Id. 
165 John Weaver, Net Metering Drives Rooftop Solar Resurgence in 
Nevada, PV-MAGAZINE (May 7, 2018), https://pv-magazine-
usa.com/2018/05/07/net-metering-in-nevada-once-again-shown-as-solar-power-
winner/. 
166 See State of New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 3723 (218th legislature) 
(signed into law May 23, 2018) (The 2019 Energy Master Plan, adopted by NJ 
Gov. Phil Murphy, both accepted as a truth that humans are the leading drivers 
of climate change and mandated a conversion of the State’s energy production 
profile to be 100% clean by 2050). 
167 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(l). 
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exceed annual electric consumption on-site.168 Third, monthly credits 
carry over169 and the annual excess generation,170 leftover credits at the 
end of an annual billing cycle, are paid out to distributed generators at the 
avoided cost rate i.e. wholesale.171 These three features represent a gold 
standard for new generation net metering laws. The fourth feature of the 
New Jersey Model is a state-wide net metering cap with a 2.9% of state 
annual sales of electricity.172  
 
(L) New York 
 New York responded quite uniquely to lobbying from the utility 
industry. Initially, like most states, New York had a standard retail 
compensation scheme for distributed generation.173 It also had a state net 
metering cap that started at one percent, was increased to three percent, 
and then doubled to six percent.174 However, in 2017, in response to utility 
concerns, New York transitioned its scheme from the standard net 
metering model to a compensation model called the Value of Distributed 
Energy Resource (“VDER”).175 This new model is arguably the most 
complex compensation model in the United States, as it accounts for a 
series of considerations while demanding “fair and accurate compensation 
 
168 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(a). 
169 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(d). 
170 Note: this is different from annual generation in that the annual 
system generation cap is measured against a previous 12-month energy supply 
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than the previous annual system generation cap. 
171 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(e). 
172 Id.; New Jersey Net Metering, DSIRE (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/38. But see New Jersey 
Senate Bill 2018-S592, LEGISSCAN (Jan. 2018), 
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173 David G. Schieren, New York Solar Net-Metering is Under Attack, 
SUNPOWER (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.empower-solar.com/blog/our-
response-to-net-metering-changes. 
174 New York Net Metering, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://www.energy.gov/savings/net-metering-23 (last accessed Mar. 9, 2019); 
New York Net Metering, DSIRE (Jan. 5, 2019), 
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/453. 
175 Kerry Thoubborn, VDER: NY’s Replacement to Net Metering, 
ENERGYSAGE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://news.energysage.com/vder-ny-
replacement-net-metering/. 
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to all market participants.”176 VDER seeks to do this by “creat[ing] 
different values for the electric system [used], and impose different costs 
on the electric system, depending on its individual characteristics and the 
nature of its use, including when and where the [distributed energy 
resource] is operated.”177 The new approach itself attempts to value 
distributed generation by including value for “reduced energy 
consumption, energy generation, green energy attributes . . . , capacity, 
reduced system stress, displacement of the need for traditional grid 
infrastructure, increased reliability, load shifting, demand response, peak 
load reduction, voltage support, frequency management and reactive 
power.”178 This new system is undoubtedly one of the most in-depth and 
nuanced compromises between pro-renewable advocates, utility 
companies, and non-distributed generation customers. 
Under the VDER model, net metering installations installed pre-
2017 VDER implementation were grandfathered in.179 Second, two 
components were implemented in the post-2017 “phase one” period.180 
The pre-existing net metering compensation shceme will cover phase one 
net metering, including new distributed generation installations between 
March 9, 2017, and January 1, 2020, albeit with a twenty-year contract 
cap.181 The second component is the “Value Stack” tariff.182 This tariff is 
based on monetary crediting for net hourly injections and will receive 
compensation for a term of twenty-five years.183 It also applies specifically 
to certain defined system types, namely community distributed 
generators.184 Furthermore, the tariff modifies compensation for solar plus 
 
176 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, 2017 N.Y. P.U.C. 
LEXIS 121, *29 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
177 Id. at 30. 
178 Id. at 31, 32 (“For any individual DER, [net energy metering] may 
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179 New York Net Metering, supra note 174. 
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181 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 176, at 
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182 Id. at 23–24. 
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184 See John Farrell, Is New York’s Compromise the Future for Net 
Metering?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2017/03/06/is-new-yorks-
compromise-the-future-for-net-metering.html. The new law has all but closed 
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storage generators by lowering the compensation when energy is fed back 
to the grid from a storage site, depending on the size of the generation 
system.185 As it stands, New York’s regulatory approach to net metering 
will be a system on which to keep an eye, especially if future legislators 
seek to make a compromise in net metering policies for all parties affected.  
 
IV. SECTION IV 
 If any picture can be painted from the survey of the net metering 
regulatory landscape, it is the disunity of policies across the United States. 
The constantly shifting landscape produced a hodgepodge of solar 
adoption rates across the states, spurned both residential and commercial 
investors in the solar energy field nationwide, produced disparity in legal 
treatment between early adopters and newcomers, and did little to truly 
alter the centralized IOU/MU model that dominates energy distribution. 
 
(A) The Effect on Investors - Uncertainty 
 Studies show that net metering is the most utilized state inventive 
for renewable power nationwide.186 The shifting landscape regarding net 
metering poses a risk to both current and future investors in the solar 
field.187 With seven years of data to work with since the utility lobby has 
both successfully and unsuccessfully lobbied to reduce net metering 
compensation schemes, there is evidence across all fifty states of the risk 
posed to solar investors.188 Nevada’s 2015 compensation scheme189 is 
perhaps one of the starkest examples of the effects a shifting regulatory 
scheme can have on investors. From the implementation of the scheme in 
2015, Nevada lost one-third of all solar jobs in a year and a half period.190 
 
community but requires that the community projects to still pay full retail to the 
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185 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 176, at 
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SolarCity and Sunrun, Nevada’s two largest solar operations, both 
announced they were leaving the state soon after the 2015 scheme was 
introduced.191 However, while risk from an operational standpoint is 
always associated with regulation, the regulatory posture drastically 
affects the average consumer, as well. First, from a pure investment 
standpoint, anti-net metering policies put downward pressure on solar 
stocks.192 Sunrun Inc. declined from its $13.74 per share high on 
December 18, 2015, to $5.04 on February 12, 2016, representing a sixty-
nine percent drop in share price following Nevada’s decision.193 Second, 
and more importantly for the average solar investor, was the Nevada 
Public Utilities Commission’s willingness to apply its 2015 pricing 
scheme retrogressively to existing solar customers.194 This drastic move 
showed one of the greatest potential risks for the average consumer, 
regarding a shifting regulatory climate. Not only did it negatively affect 
future investments in the US from residential customers, it also affected 
investor expectations that were based on previous regulatory promises. 
While this net metering policy shift seems to be the exception and not the 
rule,195 the mere possibility of this happening in other states that adopt pro-
utility legislation can certainly make future solar adopters skittish about 
their investment. 
 Additionally, uncertainty among legislatures and public utility 
commissions on how to properly value the cost of distributed generation 
going forward is a hinderance for future solar investments. New York 
indeed established itself as the leading state considering the greatest 
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variable of metrics regarding the cost of solar.196 And yet, the New York 
VDER model has quite created one of the most complex regulatory fields 
for future investments, also standing out as the exception rather than the 
rule.  
The more standard rule is that states are split among a dichotomy, 
with net meter rates determined by public utility commissions that favor 
either solar advocates or the utility industry.197 And with these rates 
constantly changing and under review,198 intense pressure is placed upon 
solar businesses in creating an effective strategy for solar investments.  
 
(B) Lack of Judicial Resource 
The effect around uncertainty in rate changing is only exacerbated when 
investors realize that there is little recourse to federal judicial review to 
challenge rates that are either mildly biased towards favoring net metering, 
or blatantly so. This is because The Johnson Act largely barred federal 
courts from interfering with state administrative agencies and their 
subdivisions regarding rate-making decision. 199 
 Moreover, since the seminal decision in Federal Power 
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,200 the Supreme Court adopted a 
level of deference to utility rate pricing by utility regulators and takings 
clause violations.201  In Hope Natural Gas, the Court considered a rate 
order issued by the Federal Power Commission which reduced rates 
chargeable by the utility company Hope Natural Gas.202 In considering the 
challenge that the mandated rate did not adequately address the utility 
company’s needs, the Court stated that it “cannot say they are 
[inadequate], unless we are to substitute our opinions for the expert 
judgment of the administrators to whom Congress entrusted the 
decision.”203 To do so otherwise would insert into the congressionally 
mandated rate charging authority that public utility commissions possess 
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a “novel doctrine which has no express statutory sanction.”204 As such, the 
Supreme Court noted that an agency’s rate order is “the product of expert 
judgment which carries a presumption of validity,” and “he who would 
upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a 
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable 
in its consequences.”205 This decision largely freed courts from oversight 
of a public utility commission’s utility pricing mechanisms and shifted 
judicial oversight to examining the reasonableness of the resulting rate.206 
This holding largely extended to state court decisions, as well.207 
Ultimately, this jurisprudence now cuts both ways, and it should208 largely 
bar distributed generators from challenging their own compensation 
schemes under new net metering regulations. 
 Therefore, going forward, uncertainty in the face of future 
regulations presents the largest challenge for solar adoption nationwide. 
Accurately structuring business strategies is immensely complicated and 
costly when faced with a shifting regulatory landscape. In some cases, a 
regulatory shift can be so drastic as to result in the immediate winding 
down of current operations in a state or it causes delays in starting 
operations in another. This uncertainty is not only limited to net metering 
regulations, but also to solar-storage regulations,209 and continues to bar 
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207 Id. at 233 (first citing Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dep't of Pub. 
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2010) (upholding SFV natural gas rate design) (“The lack of a governing statute 
telling the commission how it must design rates vests the commission with 
broad discretion in this area.”); and then citing Application of Ark. La. Gas Co., 
558 P.2d 376, 377 (Okla. 1976) (“The establishment of rates and the 
apportionment thereof among various groups of customers is a legislative 
function of the Commission.”]). 
208 But see infra Section V (A). 
209 See infra (B) Progressing towards Solar-plus-Storage adoption. 
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mass solar adoption so long as the uncertainty remains. Thus, the focus 
going forward needs to be on establishing a semblance of stability in a 
market that is anything but stable. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SOLAR INDUSTRY GOING 
FORWARD 
 The shift in the net metering regulatory landscape is indeed 
laudable for most parties concerned. New rate models and net metering 
compensation schemes are seeking innovative ways to accurately take 
utility industry, solar, and non-solar customer concerns into account. 
However, while New York offered the most comprehensive model yet 
towards this goal, other states continue to balk at supporting distributed 
generation which is undermining the progress toward adoption of 
renewable energy rates nationwide. Thus, these states and certain pro-
utility net metering laws are the initial focus of this next section. 
 
(A) A Takings Clause Challenge to the Buy All/Sell All                    
Compensation Scheme 
 Connecticut, Maine, and Nevada’s net metering compensation 
schemes have presented the greatest threat to both net metering’s progress 
nationwide and to in-state solar investments. First, recall that the buy 
all/sell all model, enacted in all three states, forces all distributed 
generators to sell all their electricity to the utility company at the wholesale 
rate and then buy back what is needed for their energy consumption at the 
utility retail sales rate. I propose that this net metering scheme be 
challenged as an illegal taking of a distributed generator’s property in 
violation of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.210  
 The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution commands 
simply, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” The application of this clause to challenging utility rates 
is no stranger to the field of utility rate pricing, albeit it has almost 
uniformly been used by utility companies in its history. In fact, in the case 
of Takings Clause challenges to utility regulation and pricing, the Supreme 
Court developed a distinct line of jurisprudence.211 The Federal Power 
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.212 decision, discussed supra, 
provided guidance for a Takings Clause challenge in the context of utility 
 
210 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
211 See McLean, supra note 201, at 10875. 
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rate pricing. In Hope Natural Gas, the Supreme Court adopted its 
deferential approach to utility rate pricing by articulating an “end results” 
test.213 Under this test, the Court made clear that rates that enable a 
company to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity, attract 
capital, and compensate its investors cannot be condemned as invalid.214 
This created a presumption of validity concerning rate-making that cannot 
be successfully challenged without convincingly showing that a rate is 
unjust or unreasonable.215 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this test in 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch in 1989, which upheld a Pennsylvania law 
that prohibited consideration of utilities’ stranded costs into the utility rate 
formulation.216 The Supreme Court grounded its decision in the fact of a 
loss of revenue of $35 million for Dusquesne Light Company because of 
its stranded costs, which amounted to two percent of the utility’s base and 
only reduced the utility’s annual allowance by two-fifths percent and did 
not “jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving 
them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise 
future capital… [and it did not show] that these rates are inadequate to 
compensate current equity holders from the risk associated with their 
investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.”217 
 This decision laid the ground work for a successful challenge to 
net metering, for utility companies now know they must put forth an 
argument that net metering leaves utility companies with stranded costs 
that do meet the threshold of “jeopardiz[ing] the financial integrity” of the 
utility companies, which amounts to a constitutional taking.218 However, 
irony has it that Hope Natural Gas and Dusquesne provide the ammunition 
needed to overturn a buy all/sell all net metering scheme by a challenge 
originating from the distributed generator. 
As stipulated, a showing must be made that a rate is unjust or 
unreasonable to be successful. And the Supreme Court impliedly 
articulated that one way to meet this burden is to show a rate- making 
jeopardizes the financial integrity of a company or by providing rates 
inadequate to compensate equity holders. Here, with evidence that 
emerged out of Nevada and Maine and which can be applied to 
Connecticut going forward, it is clear that a buy all/sell all program is 
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indeed unjust and unreasonable when asserted from the perspective of 
distributed generators. The buy all/sell all model in Connecticut seeks to 
shift net metering compensation that was historically granted at retail rates 
to the wholesale rate, which the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority will 
determine. The effect of this in Nevada was clear in that it cannot 
adequately compensate future solar investments and prevents third-party 
investors from reaching profitable margins. The fact is, the wholesale rate 
compensation package cannot give a return to match the initial investment 
costs made into solar installation, let alone have the investment reach a 
level of profitability.  
 Utility companies do have a viable defense in distinguishing that 
the line of Takings Clause cases under Hope Natural Gas and Dusquesne 
applies only to utility monopolies and that new distributed generators 
cannot rely upon such precedent. However, that leads to the possibility for 
distributed generator’s to make a Takings Clause claim under the 
traditional land use context. In the land use context, the Supreme Court 
addressed what constitutes an invalid taking by applying a multi-factored 
ad hoc balancing test.219 In Pennsylvania Central Transportation, the 
Supreme court enumerated three factors to be considers: [1] “the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claim[,]” [2] “the extent to which a 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations,” 
and [3] “the character of the governmental action.”220 As the test stands 
today, the economic impact of the regulation needs to “substantially 
exceed 50%” and be closer to ninety percent of the property diminished.221 
The “distinct investment backed expectations” was modified to an 
interference with a “reasonable investment-backed expectations”222 and 
the character of governmental action was clarified to include a regulation 
that interferes with an existing use of property.223 While this test was 
intended for a traditional land taking, it extended to the taking of personal 
property as well.224 
 Pleading a case under the Penn. Central inquiry has merit. First, 
the buy all/sell all regulation is mandated by the government and is a 
regulation that distinctly interferes with the use of property. Second, the 
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substantial decrease in value of the solar investment must be pled on a 
case-by-case basis, but with wholesale electricity costs ranging as low as 
two cents per kilowatt and retail costs raising as high as twenty-six cents 
per kilowatt, legitimate arguments can be made. Third, in respect to 
reasonable investment backed expectations, the owner’s expectations are 
measured before the regulation instead of after the regulation, thereby 
creating an objective fact-based determination based on market rather than 
individual expectations.225  
Providing evidence for reasonable market expectations should not 
prove difficult. Solar installations are often sized either to system capacity 
limit or to a proximate size that expect to offset either a portion or all of 
energy consumption demand. Additionally, agreements with third-party 
solar providers, either in the form of lease agreement’s or power purchase 
agreements, share a uniformity across the market, and are based on 
expectations of power demand based upon a set return cost for providing 
that power. Furthermore, for future installers considering solar, reasonable 
market expectations are set. A solar system is expected to pay off its initial 
investment in anywhere from a ten to twenty-five year period. Regardless 
of if that solar system produces excess power over personal demand, an 
objective market expectation of any investor would be that an investor gets 
first use of the product of his investment. Here the investment is the fixed 
costs into installation of the solar system, and the product of the labor of 
this investment is electricity. Just as a farmer of raisins has a reasonable 
expectation that he can use and dispose of the fruits of his labor,226 so too 
should the “farmer” of electricity be able to use and dispose of his own 
product without governmental interference.227 As the buy all/sell all 
 
225 Jonathan Houtan ET AL., The Basics of a Regulatory Taking Inverse 
Condemnation Claim, ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS (Jan. 24–26, 2019), 
https://www.ali-cle.org/search/courses-webcasts-telephone-ondemand-
publications-
coursematerials/The%20Basics%20of%20a%20Regulatory%20Taking%20Inver
se%20Condemnation%20Claim. 
226 Cf. Horne 135 S. Ct. at 2419–30 (considering whether a requirement 
that raisin growers set aside a portion of their raisin crop to the government to 
stabilize the market constituted a taking requiring just compensation, the Court 
found that it was for title of the raisins were transferred to the government, and 
therefore lose the entire bundle of property rights in the appropriated raisins i.e. 
the right to possess, use and dispose of them). 
227 But see Mclean, supra note 201, at 10878 (arguing that electricity, 
or the electrons produced, is not a traditional property product such as farming 
but rather a different category of goods such as oysters which are farae naturae, 
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requirement forces the sale of electricity at a wholesale cost and precludes 
the distributed generator’s personal use of his or her own produced 
electricity before the sale, it is clear doing so interferes with the reasonable 
expectations of an investment. 
 While challenging the buy all/sell all regime is just one small step 
in the continued push toward renewable energy adoption, it poses 
significant advantages to the solar industry. The Takings Clause challenge 
is inherently unique to the specific buy all/sell all regulation and is not 
transferrable to other forms of net metering regulation. However, it is a 
weapon in the arsenal which can and should be wielded to challenge a 
program that is already proven to be the ultimate “death spiral” for the 
solar industry.  
 
(B) Progressing towards Solar-plus-Storage adoption. 
 Another character feature of many new net metering laws is the 
feed in tariff charges that regulators allow utilities to charge net metering 
customers for connecting to and supplying to the grid.228 This model is 
completely dependent on the current premise that the majority of 
residential solar systems cannot supply 100% of consumption demands. 
Most of the solar system energy is generated during daylight peak hours 
when the average generator is away from the household, and most of the 
energy consumption comes in the hours after work, representing the peak 
energy rates. Thus, solar system generators generally roll the meter back 
during the day and then push it forward at night. However, this is largely 
due to many solar models needing to instantly transfer its electricity 
generated directly to a source, rather than being able to store it onsite for 
later use. Theoretically, the correctly installed distributed generator, 
combined with a storage mechanism, can create houses, or even 
communities that are 100% independent from the grid, or in the very least, 
that are never needed to supply energy back to the grid, even though the 
system may still need to pull from the grid.229 
 
subject to the absolute control of the state, or dangerous products such as 
chemicals, which require a permit to sell those products) This argument is 
flawed. Oysters are farae naturae because they arise from nature, unlike 
electricity which, beyond lightning strikes, is not. As well, electricity generation 
does not pose the same societal risks associated with selling toxic chemicals and 
substances, especially when generated on a small scale for personal use. 
228 See Section III supra (A) & (G). 
229 See generally David Frankel and Amy Wagner, Battery Storage: 
The Next Disruptive Technology in the Power Sector, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 
17, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-
insights/battery-storage-the-next-disruptive-technology-in-the-power-sector. 
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 However, we are not yet at this reality. Where the solar systems 
improved and proliferated across the last two decades, solar storage 
systems are not at the same level. Solar storage only recently started 
realizing its potential as synergies with distributed generation began to 
emerge.230 And while the economics are starting to catch up,231 solar-plus-
storage laws are far behind. Many states indicated above have altogether 
prohibited onsite solar storage.232 However, others such as Colorado are 
pioneering the legislative framework around solar storage. In 2018, the 
Colorado Legislature passed SB 18-009. The statute states: 
 
The threat of interruptions in electric supply due to 
weather, malicious interference, or malfunctions in 
centralized generation and transmission facilities makes 
distributed resources, including energy storage systems 
paired with other distributed resources, an effective way 
for residents to provide their own reliable and efficient 
supply of electricity. . . [Therefore] Colorado's consumers 
of electricity have a right to install, interconnect, and use 
energy storage systems on their property without the 
burden of unnecessary restrictions or regulations and 
without unfair or discriminatory rates or fees.233 
 
As one of the most progressive energy storage laws in the country, 
Colorado’s agenda plans for that point when a breakthrough is finally 
made in commercial on-site energy storage.234  
 
230 See Emily Fisher, Energy Storage for Solar Systems Will be an 
$8Billion Market in 2026, LUX RES. INC. (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/news-and-events/press-releases/read/energy-
storage-solar-systems-will-be-8-billion-market-2026 (coining the term as 
‘partial grid deflection’ and leading consulting firm McKinsey & Co. is betting 
that this will become the latest disruptor to the energy market). 
231 See Frankel & Wagner, supra note 229 (“[B]attery-pack costs are 
down to less than $230 per kilowatt-hour in 2016, compared with almost $1,000 
per kilowatt-hour in 2010.”). 
232 See Section III supra (G)Florida; see also states that have mandated 
a buy all/sell all program thereby indirectly prohibiting on site solar ). 
233 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-130(1)(a)(II), (1)(b)(II) (West 
2018). 
234 See Aundene Szmolyan, The Age of Abundance: Revelation of 
Reality, or Revolution of Green?, ENVIROLINE (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://www.envirolinenews.ca/news-analysis/news/2018/02/06/the-age-of-
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However, recommending that all states adopt a similar energy 
storage statute would be as successful as asking all states to adopt a 
uniform set of net metering policies that compensated distributed 
generation at the retail rate; the same concerns that affect the utility lobby 
regarding net metering235 also affect energy storage systems. That is not to 
say that Colorado’s legislation should not be a model for future solar-
storage legislation. Undoubtedly it should be, at least if you are a pro solar 
advocate.  
Pro-solar storage regulations can also help offset net metering 
regulations that shifted away from retail compensation schemes to time-
of-use compensation schemes.236 As recalled from Section IV(B) supra, a 
time-of-use regulation reduces the return on investment because it 
compensates for solar electricity when demand for energy is at its lowest, 
and then charges for consumption at the time when the rates are highest, 
rather than compensating at a set retail parity pricing. The allowance for 
the installation of solar-storage systems where time of use regulations are 
in place allows distributed generators to bank their own generation on site 
during the day in order to be utilized in the evening.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The solar industry, much like the utility industry, enjoyed rapid 
growth due in large part to regulatory policies designed to further 
implementation. However, the last decade proved challenging for solar as 
numerous tax incentives and credits are winding down, parity pricing net 
metering regulation is transforming into new regulatory schemes, and 
IOUs are pouring millions of dollars into anti solar campaigns. Solar-
storage presents the greatest solution for a true, large scale breakthrough 
of distributed generation in the United States, but that industry too is soon 
to come under immense pressure. If we seek to truly modernize our 
electricity consumption and usher in a new paradigm to replace the utility 
model built by Thomas Edison over 100 years ago, it will take a 
coordinated effort on behalf of state legislatures across the country to bring 
a level of certainty to a market that has anything but. 
  
 
abundance-revelation-of-reality-or-revolution-of-green/ (of all panels at The 
Economist’s 2017 Annual Energy Summit, the singular agreed upon point is that 
for successful widespread progress towards a green energy future requires a 
breakthrough in energy storage). 
235 See generally supra Section II.  
236 See Section III, supra (B). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 Figure 4. Schematic of Net Energy Metering  
(Source: NREL, 2017) 
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